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v.

LINDLEY
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[Crim. No. 4614. In Bank. July 30, 1945.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM MARVIN
LINDLEY, Appellant.
[1] Oriminal Law-Trial-Proceedings After Recovery of Sanity.
-The certificate of the superintendent of a state hospital for
the insane, upon the release of a person for trial on a criminal
charge, need not, under Pen. Code, § 1372, be in any particular
form, and if the sheriff and the district attorney received a
.notiee from the hospital that defendant is Dot insane and the
judge remarked at the commencement of the trial that defendant was returned to ~urt "as sane," the presumption, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, is that the duties of the
superintendent and other ofticials were property performed,
and that defendant was duly discharged and was brought into
eourt in the manner prescribed by statute.
[2] Id.-'1'rial-Doubt of Sanity as Basis for TriaJ.-Tbe "doubt"
as to the sanity of a defendant, requiring a trial of sllch issue
under Pen. Code, § 1368, is one that must arise in the mind of
the trial judge, rather than in the mind ot counsel for the
defendant· or in that of any third person.
[8] Id.-TriaJ-Insanity Bequiring Trial-DiscretioD of Oourt.A determination of a motion for a hearing on the issue of a
defendant's sanity at the time of trial is one which rests within
the sound discretion of the court, and its denial of the motion
will not be disturbed on appeal where there is no abuse of discretion.
[4] Homicide-Evidenee-Suffi:ciency.-A conviction of murder of
a 13-year-old girl was sustained by testimony indicating that
defendant had ample opportunity to attack the girl and leave
her unconscious at the place where she was found in response
to her cries; that he was the only person who fitted the description of the person who had been seen at that plMe shortly
prior W thE' ofTpn!lr:that he was the person whom the girl
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[1] See 8 OaLJur. 199.
[3] Investigation of present sanity to determine whether accused
should be put, or continue, on trial, note, 142 A.L.R. 961. See, also,
8 Oal.Jur. 195; 4 OalJur. IO-Yr. Supp. (1943 rev.), 721.
Mclt. Dig. Beferences: [1] Criminal Law, § 236(8); [2] Crimi- I
Dal Law, § 236(2); [3] Criminal Law, § 236(4); [4] HomicidE',
§ 145; [5] Homicide, § 15(6); [6] Homicide, § 249; [7) Criminal
Law, § 1315; [8] Homicide, § 145(3); [9] Rape, § 4; [10] Homi-·
cidt', § 267; [11] Homicide, § 238 i [12] HOl!licide, § 181.
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referred to as "the redheaded man" who attacked her; and
that he was identified as the man whOm a boy saw "fighting"
with the girl.
[6] Id.-Murder in First Degree.-Where a murder is committed
in perpetration or attempted perpetration of any. of the felonies enumerated in Pen. Code, § 189, the offender is guilty of
m nrder of the first degree by the mere force of the statute.
[6] Id.-Appeal-Review of Evidence.-Even where the. evidence
in a murder case does not establish conclusively that the murder was committed in perpetration or attempted perpetration
of any of the felonies enumerated in Pen. Code, § 189, if the
record affords substantialsupport for the conclusion that one
of the enumerated felonies was perpetrated or attempted, and
the killing was committed in such perpetration or attempt,
a conviction of murder of the first degree must be aftlrmed.
[7] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.-After a
conviction all intendments are in favor of the judgment and
a verdict will not be set aside unless the record clearly shows
that on no hypothesis is there sufficient substantial evidence
to support it.
[8a, 8b]Homicide-Evidence-Sufiiciency.-ln a prosecution for
murder of a lS-year-old girl, the evidence supported the conclusion of the jury that death resulted from injuries sustained
either in a rape or an attempted perpetration of rape, where,
at the time she was found in response to her cries for help,
she was weak, choking, bruised and· close to death; her clothinl!' was torn and she told those who came to her aid that she
had been attacked by an "old red headed man," which answered defendant's description; and the wounds reyealed by
the autopsy corroborated her charge.
[9] Ra.pe - Penetration. -In establishing rape, evidence of any
sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the
crime. (Pen. Code, § 263.)
[10] Homicide-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-In a prosecution for murder, any error in an instruction as to the burderi of proving circumstances of mitigation
did not prejltdice defendant's rights where under the evidence
the only cnme of which he could have been found guilty was
a killing in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of rape.
[11] Id. - Instructions - Punishment-Discretion of Jl11'7.-It is
not error to instruct the jury that if they find defendant guilty
of murder in the first degree, with some utenuating facts or
circumstances, it is within their disoretion to specify a sentenoe which will relieve him from the extreme penalty, but
that, if there are no e:rtenuating circumstances, it is their duty
to find a simple verdict of murder in the first degree and leave
with the law the responsibility of fixing the punishment.
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[12] Id.-Instructions-Degrees of Offense.-In a prosecution for
murder, the jury was adequately informed concerning the difference between murder of the first and of the second degree
where the trial judge in several instructions fully and correctly
explained the essential elements of each of these offenses.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sutter County
and from an order denying a new trial. Arthur Coats,
Judge. Affirmed.
Desmond A. Winship for Appellant.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, and David K. Lener,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
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EDMONDS, J.-When he was charged with having murdered a 13-year-old girl, William Marvin Lindley pleaded not
guilty, but before the date set for trial it was brought to the
attention of the court that a doubt had arisen concerning his
sanity. Following a hearing upon that issue he was committed to the Mendocino State Hospital. Ten months later he
was released to the sheriff and brought to trial upon the
murder charge. The case is now before this court upon an
automatic appeal from the judgment imposing the death penalty which was entered upon the verdict of the jury finding
him guilty and the order denying a new trial.
The record discloses that on August 16, 1943, two days
before Jackie Hamilton, the victim of the tragedy, was found
under conditions which resulted in her death shortly afterward, she had arrived at Yuba City with her father and
mother and three sisters, Willa Mae, Barbara, and Shirley,
who were then 17, 15, and 3 years of age, respectively. The
family established a camp at a place which was between the
levee of the Feather River and the stream. Clumps of trees
dotted the area and the terrain was irregular. Some 200
yards to the northeast, built directly on the stream, was a
boathouse inhabited by William Owens, his nine-year-old son,
a man called Shorty, and Lindley. Owens had known Lindley
for about five years and had always called him "Red." The
men maintained a store in the boathouse, selling soft drinks
and merchandise to the riders and campers who frequented
the vicinity.
The Hamilton family made camp about noon on Monda1.
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but did not go to the boathouse that day. On Tuesday, Barbara went down to find out where they could get water, and
visited the boathouse several other times. The next day, a
little boy took the three older girls, Willa Mae, Barbara and
Jackie, across the river in a boat. On the opposite bank they
saw a sheepherder and his fiock. When they returned Barbara and Jackie went in swimming, and later Willa Mae
joined them.
Meanwhile Mr. Hamilton had become acquainted with the
men at the boathouse. He agreed to drive Owens and "Red"
to a place a few miles outside the city where they could collect wages due them for peach picking. The three men left
in the automobile shortly after noon. Some time later Barbara and Jackie left the water. They went up to the boathouse to change to dry clothing. Shorty was the only man
there, and he told Jackie to wrap herself in a blanket and get
her clothes from a tub in which she had placed them. She
did so, and Barbara helped her dress in the.men's restroom.
Jackie then said she would go back to camp.
Willa Mae, still in the water, saw "quite a ways off," "a
man with a brown hat and khakis. :. in the willows. . . .
It looked like he was shaking a pole going back and forth.
Shaking the willows." About this same time, which was
probably around 2 o'clock, the three men had returned from
town after completing their errands and making grocery purchases, and within five minutes after' their arrival "Red"
had taken some ale which they had bought and walked with
it in the direction of the boathouSe. Owens had stayed in
camp to visit with Mr. and Mrs. Hamilton.
"Red" was wearing a khaki suit, a "kind of brown khaki,"
shirt and pants, and a brown hat. It was a brown hat, or
one similar to it, that had been given to him by Owens.
When Jackie reached the camp, 200 yards from the boat·
house, her father, Owens, her mother and Shirley were there
but "Red" .had left. Owens was drinking from a jug of
wine bought in town; Mr. Hamilton had about two tablespoons
of it. Jackie did not mention having seen "Red" on the way.
She stayed only about five minutes and then walked back
toward the river. During this brief interval Barbara was at
the boathouse; Willa Mae had left the water and started back
to ('Amp for dry clothes. The man was still in the willows
when she left the river, 80 she took the trail to the house,
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without passing the place where he was. 'He was there when
I got through swimming," she testified, "in the willows
and I just went on to the house. I kind of got scared and
went to the house." She did not recognize the man as anyone she had seen and she had never met "Red." After reaching camp she stayed there quite a while, then changed her
clothes and took Shirley down to the boathouse. On the way
there, she did not see or look for the man in the willows.
Meanwhile at the boathouse "Red" had come in and joined
Barbara and Shorty about 15 or 20 minutes after Jackie left
for camp. He did not mention having stopped in the willows
on the way, or having met and injured Jackie, if he did so.
His whereabouts over the period of 15 minutes is not accounted for unless he was the man in the willows. He sat
around drinking beer and smoking one cigarette after another.
Five or six minutes after "Red's" arrival, Willa Mae came
in with Shirley, and about 15 or 20 minutes after that two
boys, Richard and Lawrence, who were riding horses, stopped
at the boathouse. The group talked for 20 or 25 minutes and
then the two boys went to get their horses. Willa Mae. the
baby and Barbara started to walk toward the camp. A period
of 60 or 70 minutes had then elapsed since Jackie left the
boathouse and paid her five-minute visit to the camp.
The group of young people came upon Owens sitting on a
hump of bermuda grass on the hill. He had left the camp
after sitting around with Mr. Hamilton for an hour or an hour
and a quarter. He said he was taking sand out of his shoe.
That took him three or four minutes, and he then went on
down to the boathouse and joined Shorty and "Red." Three
or four minutes after he reached the boathouse, and while
Barbara, Willa Mae, and the baby were watching the two
boys mount their horses, they heard Jackie call out "help,
I am drowning," and similar cries. Willa Mae and Barbara
were not alarmed as Jackie had been fooling them all morning by calling for help and pretending that she was drowning.
Willa Mae went on to camp with the baby and told her mother
she guessed her sister had fainted. She knew Jackie had not
been well because of successive bouts with rheumatic fever
and its effect upon her heart, but she was "gaining and getting very stout. A very healthy looking little girl."
Barbara remarked to the boys, "She is fooling; she has
been fooling all day like that," but the boys said they would
CO down and see. Richard went part way on his horse and
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called, "you are not going to drown in the sand." BJ.t
Jackie had recognized Barbara's voice and said "help, Barbara, help." Then Barbara· also cried out for help and
the father went to the aid of the girls. He placed the time
of the cry as 10 miJl.utes or less after Owens left the camp.
It was eStimated as 3 :15 or 3 :20, or an hour and a quarter
after the men returned from town.
Jackie was lying outside the willows on thp. sand. ShA
was on her side with her fllce turned partly into the hand.
There was a little spot of blood on her cheek, dry blood in
her nose and "great big reddish blue purple spot.'1 on her
little throat like somebody had hold of her throat." According to her father's testimony, she said, "Daddy, that
old red headed man; that dirty liar at the boathouse." Barbara testified that in suggesting to her father, "Daddy, let's
take her to the boathouse." Jackie replied. "No, that old
man at the boathouse, he did it, the dirty liar.tlThe father
also told the jury that she kept saying. _ "The old red
headed man. the dirty liar, did it."
The clothing on the child was torn in front. She had on
only the waist and skirt in which Barbara had helped dress
her, with no shoes, stockings or panties. The dress had not
been torn· when she put it on after her swim. She was so weak
and bruised she could not walk. With the help of the boys
the automobile was brought near and she was placed in it.
The men at the boathouse had heard Barbara scream and
holler "Bill" (Owens). Shorty was in the house; "Red" was
sitting in front on a box; and Owens was lying on a pad
or mattress he had thrown on the floor. Owens jumped
up and ran to the automobile, arriving as they were getting Jackie into the car. He asked to ride to the hospital
with them. En route they stopped at the sheriff's office for
directions and the sheriff, in his car, cleared the road for
them to the hospital. The little girl passed away on the
operating table about 15 minutes after arrival. This was
between 3 :45 and 4 :15.
The physician who examined her testified: "When she was
brought to the hospital she was in very poor condition. As a
matter of fact she was breathing her last. She was quite blue
and you might say she was shocked to death. • . • The cause
of death was asphyxiation. . . . It can occur from a variety of
eauses"; it could come from being choked. He said the girl
bore no evidence of drowning. But coming to consciousness

788

)

I

/

\

I

PEOPLE V. LINDLEY

[26 C.2d

and the call for help came he went up to the -ear and
made inquiry as to what had occurred.
The judgment based upon this testimony is challenged
upon four grounds. First, it is said, the record shows no
evidence that Lindley had regained his sanity. The second
point relied upon for reversal is the asserted insufficiency
of the evidence to establish that Lindley committed the homicide. As also justifying a new trial, counsel points out that
the evidence is insufficient to establish the crime as murder
of the first degree. Finally, complaint is made of certain
instructions to the jury.
[1] The contention that there is no evidence tending to
prove Lindley's sanity at the time of the trial is based
·upon the sheriff's failure to produce a certificate signed by
the superintendent of the state hospital showing that he
had been discharged from that institution. This point, however, was mentioned for the first time on the motion for
a new trial. Although at the opening of the trial, Lindley's counsel stated that he still doubted defendant's sanity,
and he unsuccessfully moved the court to determine the
question, no further objection was made then or at any
time prior to the verdict and judgment.
Section 1372 of the Penal Code reads: "If the defendant is
received into the state hospital he must be detained there
until he becomes sane. When he becomes sime, the superintendent must certify that fact to the sheriff and district attorney of the county. The sheriff must thereupon, without
delay, bring the defendant from the state hospital, and place
him in proper custody until he is broug-ht to trial or judgment, as the case may be, or is legally discharged."
The Legislature has made no requirement that the certificaation of sanity be in any particular form or that it be produced in court as a prerequisite to the right to proceed to trial.
It is, as stated in People v. Superior Court, 4 Ca1.2d 136, 147
[47 P.2d 724], "at most, merely a formal statement made to
the sheriff and district attorney that the defendant is not
insane, and there is in fact no specific requirement that it be
filed, nor does there appear to be great reason why it should
be." In the case of Lindley, it appears that the sheriff received a notice from the hospital, as did also the district attorney. There is nothing to indicate that a suffieient certifieation of sanity was not duly made or that, if demanded,it
could not have been produced. At the commencement of the

July 1945]

PEOPLE

v.

LINDLEY

789

[26 C.2d 780; 161 P.2d 227)

)

trial the judge remarked in open court that "the man has been
returned to this court as sane." The presumption, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, is that the duteis of the
superintendent and other officials were properly performed.
that the defendant was duly discharged from the hospital and
that he was brought into court in the manner prescribed by
statute. (Maloney v. Massachusetts etc. Co., 20 Ca1.2d 1
[123 P.2d 449J; People v. Superior Court, supra; People v.
McGee, 24 Cal.App.2d 391 [75 P.2d 533]; People v. Howard,
134 Cal.App. 441 [25 P.2d 498].)
[2] Section 1368 of the Penal Code provides: "If at any
time during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment
a doubt arises as to the sanity of the defendant, the court
must order the question as to his sanity to be determined. . . ."
The "doubt" mentioned is one that must arise in the mind
of the trial judge, rather than in the mind of counsel for the
defendant or in that of any third person (People v. Perry,
14 Cal.2d 387, 399 r94 P.2d 559, 124 A.L.R. 11231, and cases
there cited) [3] and the determination of a motion for a
hearing upon the issue of a defendant's sanity at the time
of trial is one which rest!'1 within the sound discretion of the
court. Necessarily, an appellate court cannot measure to a
nicety the basi!'1 for the ruling, and the trial judge must always be allowed 8 wide latitude. (People v. Perry, supra,
at pp. 397-399. and authorities there reviewed, 124 A.L.R.
1123: People v. Cramer, 21 Ca1.2d 531 [133 P.2d 399]; People
v. Croce. 208 Cal. 123, 131-134 [280 P. 526]; People v. 01.1berg, 197 Cal. 306. 311-312 [240 P. 1000]; People v. Keyes,
178 Cal. 794, 801-802[175 P. 6]; People v. Fountain, 170 Cal.
460,467 [150 P. 3411; People v. Hettick, 126 Cal. 425 [58 P.
918]; People v. Geiger, 116 Cal. 440 [48 P. 389]; People v.
Kirby, 15 Cal.App. 264, 269 [114 P. 794]; 8 Cal.Jur. § 270.
p. 195; 4 Cal.Jur 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 rev.) 721; 142 A.L.R.
note, p. 961, at p 983.) Certainly there is nothing in the
record of the present case indicating an abuse of discretion.
On the contrary, it appears that the trial judge was well aware
of his statutory duty. for in denying the motion for an inquiry
into Lindley'S sanity at that time he ruled: "The question has
once before been raised and the man has been returned to
this Court as sane. The Court has no .other discretion but to
proceed with the criminal case and if it should develop during
the trial the Court may stop proceedings at any time." More-
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over, Lindley took the witness stand and gave perfectly lucid
testimony in his own behalf and the reporter's transcript
shows nothing which occurred during the course of the tria 1
tending to raise any "doubt" whatever as to the defendant's then sanity.
[4] Concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict of the jury, the te...ntimony of the witnesses for the
People shows no material inconsistencies or contradictions.
All of them frankly admit to taking no account of time in
their movements during the day. Every time estimate given
was qualified as being only an approximation, yet much more
than a thread of consistency runs through the evidence presented by the prosecution. AB the events of the day of Jackie's
death were related to the jury, before reaching the boathouse
"Red" had ample opportunity to attack the little girl and
leave her unconscious at the point where she was found in
response to her cries. Unquestionably this testimony and the
physical facts are reasonably susceptible of the inference that
Lindley went directly from the camp to the willows and was
there when Jackie arrived five minutes later. The testimony
of Main may have been induced by self-interest, and the sheepherder and Willa Mae were of dull mentality, but the accounts given by Barbara and her father are full and clear,
and each of their statements is consistent with the recital
of events given by the other witnesses.
There is nothing to indicate that there was any person in
the vicinity of the boathouse other than those who were named
by the witnesses, and Lindley is the only one described as
being dressed in brown clothes and a brown hat. Also, one
may conclude with more than reasonable certainty that he is
the person to whom Jackie referred as "the red headed man
at the boathouse." Moreover, Lindley was positively identified by the shepherd boy as the man whom he saw "fighting"
with the little girl. He said: "They went down behind the
willows . . . Red got up and then he started back to the boathouse . . . I started off to the tomato patch. I got just around
the curve and heard them yell and went back . . . the little
girl was yelling for help ... I saw a man and lady come over
the levee and take this little girl up towards the road." It
was the duty of the jury to consider this evidence as against
Lindley's categorical denial of guilt and his t.estimony that
upon returning from the automobile trip, he walked down the
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road directly to the boathouse. The weight to be accorded
the statement of each of the witnesses was a question exclusively for the determination of the jury and the verdict, which
received judicial approval upon denial of the motion for a
new trial, may not, therefore, be disturbed upon appeal
(People v. Farrington, 213 Cal. 459, 463 [2 P.2d 814J ; People
v. Erno, 195 Cal. 272, 278 [232 P. 710]).
Lindley also asserts that the evidence is insufficient to
establish murder of the first degree. There is no proof,
whatever, he argues, of the commission of that crime.
[5] SectioD 189 of the Penal Code defines as murder of
the first degree, "all murder whieh is perpetrated by means
of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem . . . . " Where the mur- .
der is committed in perpetration or attempted perpetration
of any of the enumerated felonies, the offender "is guilty of
murder of the first degree by the force of the- statute"
(People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal.App.2d 52, 57 [87 P.2d 364];
see People v. Murphy, 1 Ca1.2d 37, 41 [32 P.2d 635]; People v.
Howard, 211 Cal. 322, 329 [295 P. 333, 71 AL.R. 1385J;
People v. Sutton, 17 Cal.App.2d 561 [62 P.2d 397]). H the
evidenee establishes conclusively that the murder was so committed, then only a verdict of murder of the first degree may
properly be rendered. [6] And even where the showing is
not conclusive, if the record affords substantial support for
the conclusion that one of the enumerated felonies was perpetrated or attempted, and the killing was committed in such
perpetration or attempt, the judgment must be affirmed.
(People v. Diaz, emte, p. 318 [158 P.2d 194]; P.ople v.
Brown, 22 Cal.2d 752 [141 P.2d 1]; People v. Waller, 14 Cal.
2d 693 [96 P.2d 344]; People v. Green, 13 Ca1.2d 37 [87 P.2d
821]; People v. Martin, 12 Cal.2d 466 [85 P.2d 880]; PlOple
v. Anderson, 1 Cal.2d 687 [37 P.2d 67]; People v. Miller,
121 Cal. 343, 347 [53 P. 816]; People v. De La Roi, 36 Cal.
App.2d 287· [97 P.2d 836]; People v. Meyers, 7 Cal.App.2d
351 [46 P.2d 282].) [7] After conviction all intendments
are in favor of the judgment and a verdict will nf\t be set
aside unless the record clearly shows that upon no hypothesis
whatsoever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support
it. (People v. Latona, 2 Ca1.2d 714 [43 P.2d 260]; People
v. Green, rupra; People T. De La Boi, IVPf'G.)
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[8a] Lindley contends that here the evidence fails to sufficiently establish either rape or attempted rape; that there is
no proof of lying in wait, as distinguished from the mere fact
that the murderer was concealed by the willows. (see People
v. Miles, 55 Cal. 207; People v. Thomas, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 891
[156 P.2d 7]) ; and that there is no evidence that the killing
was willful, deliberate, or premeditated. But unquestionably
the jury reasonably could have drawn from the evidence the
inference that the girl was killed in the perpetration or at·
tempted perpetration of rape. When found, she was weak,
choking, bruised. and close to death. Her clothing was torn .
and she told those who came to her aid that she had:been .
attacked by the "old red headed man" at the boathouse.:
Wounds revealed by' the autopsy corroborated her charge;>
[9] In establishing rape, evidence of any sexual penetra·
tion, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime. (Pen:r
Code, § 263; People v. Howard, 143 Cal. 316 [76P. 1116];
PeopZe v. Britt, 62 Ca1.App. 674 [217 P. 767]; People v.
Stangler, 18 Cal.2d 688 [117 P.2d 321].) [8b] Counsel
argues that none of the abrasions caused bleeding and there
was no proof as to when they might have been made. However, it was not essential to establish bleeding and an inference which could reasonably be drawn from th~ medical testimony is that the abrasions were as newly inflicted as the throat
marks. The girl's physical condition, and the marks on her
body, coupled with all of the other evidence, amply support
the conclusion that death resulted from injuries sustained
either in a rape or an attempt to rape committed by Lindley.
(People v. Dicz, lupra; People v. Brown, supra.) Under sueb
circumstances, the absence of independent proof of premeditation or deliberation is immaterial. The jury, one satisfied
that a rape was perpetrated or attempted and that Lindley
was the assailant, had no alternative but to return a verdiet
of murder of the first d e g r e e . : > : :
The last point presented concerns two instructions which,
it is claimed, are erroneous. By them, counsel argues, the
jury was instructed that homicide by Lindley being proved.
the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation or that
justified or excused it, then devolved upon him unless the
proof on the part of the prosecution tends to show that the
offense only amounted to manslaughter. Also, the argument
continues, the jurors were told that if they found Lindley
guilty of murder in the first degree, then in the absence of
lOme extenuatiDr fact Of circumstance they should impose the !
I
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extreme penalty of the law. By these instructions the jury
had no alternative but to find Lindley guilty of mm-der in the
first degree or of manslaughter or to acquit him. If they
found him guilty of murder in the first degree, according to
the instructions. the burden of proving facts and circumstances of mitigation or that justified or excused the homicide
was upon Lindley and in the absence of such proof it was the
duty of the jury to not relieve him from the' extreme penalty
of the law. Moreover, it is contended, the jurors were not adequately instructed as to the· difference between murder in
the first degree and murder in the second degree.
[10] The first of the challenged instructions is based upon
section 1105 of the Penal Code. It reads: "Upon a trial for
murder, the commission of the homicide by the defendant
being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon the defendant,
unless the proof on the part of the prosecution tends to show
that the crime committed only amounts to manslaughter or
that the defendant was justifiable or excusable,· but the burden of proof thus placed on the defendant is discharged and
satisfied if it raises in your minds a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt." Although the court added to the
statute the italicized words correctly stating that a defendant
is only required to produce enough evidence of the circumstances of the killing to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt
(People v. Wells, 10 Ca1.2d 610 [76 P.2d 493) ; People v.
Madison, 3 Ca1.2d 668 [46 P.2d 159]; People v. Post, 208
Cal. 433 [281 P. 618]) the instruction should not have been
given. However, the error, if it may be properly characterized
as such, did not prejudice the rights of Lindley. Under the
evidence the only crime of which he could have been found
guilty was a killing in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of rape, and the degree of that crime is fixed by statute.
[11] By the second instruction relied upon as justifying a
reversal of the judgment, the jurors were told that if they
found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and
also that there was some extenuating fact or circumstance in
the case, it was within their discretion to specify a sentence
which would relieve him from the extreme death penalty. But
this discretion, said the court, "is not an arbitrary one, and
is limited w determining which of two punishments shall be
inflicted, and is to be employed only when the jury is satislled that the lighter penalty should be imposed. If the evi-
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dence shows the defendant to bc guilty of murder in the first
degree, but doe..<.; not show some extenuating fact or circumstance, it is the duty of the jury to find a simple verdict of
murder in the first degree, and leave the law the responsibil.
ity of affixing the punishment." In the recent case of People
v. Kolez, 23 Ca1.2d 670 [145 P.2d 580], this court adhered to
a long line of decisions holding that the giving of such an
instruction does not constitute error.
[12] Nor is the appellant's complaint that the jury was
not adequately informed concerning the difference between
murder of the first and of the second degree well founded.
By four instructions, the trial judge fully and correctly ex·
plained the essential elements of each of these offenses.
An examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,
shows no error which has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
The evidence quite unerringly points to Lindley as the perpetrator of a revolting crime, and he had a fair and impartial
trial fully protecting him in every substantial right. Mter less
than two hours of deliberation, the jury returned its verdict
requiring that a sentence of death be imposed upon him as
punishment for his commission of murder of the first degree.
The verdict is amply justified by the law and the evidence.
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are,
and each of them is, affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgn1ent. The instruction
in terms of Penal Code, section 1105, was erroneous for reasons
set forth in People v. Thomas, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 894-896 [156
P.2d 7], and in my concurring opinion in People v. Albertson,
23 Ca1.2d 550, 586·589 [145 P.2d 7]. It is doubtful whether
such an instruction should be given even if accompanied by
a proper explanation, but in any event the sentence that the
court added in its instruction to the text of the section did
not explain adequately the meaning of the section. I do not
believe, however, that the error was prejudicial in this ease;
it is improbable that a reasonable jury properly instructed
would have rendered a different verdict.
I believe that People v. Kolez, 23 Ca1.2d 670 [145 P.2d 580],
should be overruled for the reasons set forth in my dissenting
opinion therein. Until it is, however, an instruction like
the one there involved is not erroneous.

